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Recent Developments in the Law:
Public Sector Labor Relations
Jeffrey P. Bauman'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently rendered
two notable decisions' raising the specter of a potential sea change
in the breadth of individual employee rights under the Public Em-
ploye Relations Act (PERA) and those statutory provisions giving
police and firefighters collective bargaining rights commonly
known as Act 111. 4 While these determinations are distinct in
their facts, one concerning the ability of a public employee to have
his choice of union representative during an employer's investiga-
tory interview and the other involving the rights of probationary
employees, they share an important significance - both decisions
impart far-reaching statements regarding the nature of these
statutes, the rights of public employees under Pennsylvania's
three primary labor laws, and the contours of that complex and
ever evolving interrelationship between employee, employer, and
union. Not surprisingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
granted allocatur in both of these matters, and thus, will ulti-
mately provide the final word with respect to individual employee
rights in these important areas of public sector labor relations in
the Commonwealth.
This article will summarize and analyze these two prominent
labor decisions in an effort to highlight current issues and themes
in this critical area of the law. This article is not a comprehensive
attempt to address all recent Pennsylvania appellate court deci-
1. Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law. I would like to
thank Zachary Erwin, Duquesne University Law School Class of 2006, for asking me to
contribute this piece and for his patience in the process of bringing it to fruition. I am
especially grateful to Leslie Kozler and Joy McNally for their insightful comments on prior
drafts of this article. Any and all opinions expressed herein, as well as mistakes, are solely
that of the author.
2. Gehring v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 850 A.2d 805 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2004); Office of Administration v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 848 A.2d 1063 (Pa.
Conmiw. Ct. 2004).
3. Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301.
4. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, 43 P.S. §§ 217-217.10.
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sions which concern public sector labor relations. The importance
of this area of the law, however, cannot be understated.5 Not only
do these decisions impact the vast number of men and women who
serve as public employees in the state, and who perform essential
functions for the Commonwealth, but inasmuch as each state that
grants its public employees certain employment rights, both indi-
vidually and collectively, is a unique laboratory in and of itself,
these decisions will offer a fresh contribution to the ongoing
greater experiment that is public sector labor relations.
II. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE WEINGARTEN RIGHTS:
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION V. PENNSYLVANIA
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Introduction
In Office of Administration v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board, a majority of a three-member panel of the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board's (PLRB) determination that during an investigative inter-
view, a public employee has the right to the union representative
of his choice, absent extenuating circumstances 'under PERA.
Previously, in National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten,
Inc.,' the federal High Court found that under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)7 a union employee has the right to have a
union representative attend an investigatory interview, i.e., an
interview in which the employee reasonably believes that the in-
vestigation may result in disciplinary action. In setting the pa-
rameters of this right, subsequent National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) decisions have embraced the idea that absent extenuating
circumstances, an employee also has the right to choose his or her
union representative for participation in such an interview.8 In
rejecting this approach under PERA, the Commonwealth Court
majority distinguished federal statutory labor law and decisions
rendered by the NLRB as inapt by characterizing PERA as solely
5. Vijay Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why it Should Matter to the Public
and to Academia, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401 (Spring 2003) (emphasizing the scant
attention that academia has given to public sector labor law even in light of the millions
employees who work for public sector entities and the high percentage of public expendi-
tures that are devoted to labor-related costs).
6. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69.
8. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 337 NLRB 3 (2001).
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a collective bargaining statute. As such, according to the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court, all rights under PERA are vested in
a union and only a union; an individual employee has no rights in
relation to his or her employer. Thus, the Commonwealth Court
not only spurned the federal approach to this issue and ended a
public employees' choice of representative under the Weingarten
rule for Pennsylvania's public employees, it also raised significant
questions regarding the continued validity of Weingarten rights in
the public sector and the very nature of PERA itself.
B. Facts and Procedural History
On November 13, 2001, State Correctional Officer Donald Vogel,
who was employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Com-
monwealth) and whose supervisor was Captain Soroko, was told to
report to the Captain's office for counseling. Upon arriving out-
side of Captain Soroko's office, he met with Officer Paul Lennert, a
member of the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Associa-
tion's (PSCOA or Union) local executive board. PSCOA was the
bargaining representative for the corrections officers including
Officer Vogel. Officer Vogel and Officer Lennert discussed the
reason for the meeting - numerous missed roll calls. After enter-
ing Captain Soroko's office, Officer Vogel requested that Officer
Craig Panko represent him during the counseling session. Officer
Panko was a union steward and had himself been previously
counseled for missing role calls. Officer Lennert had not received
steward training. Captain Soroko denied this initial request, as
well as Officer Vogel's reassertion that Officer Panko represent
him during the session. While Officer Lennert volunteered to re-
lieve Officer Panko from his duties to facilitate Officer Panko's
representation of Vogel, this was also rejected by Captain Soroko.
In fact, Captain Soroko insisted that Officer Lennert stay to rep-
resent Officer Vogel during the interview.
During the interview, Captain Soroko admonished Officer Vogel
for being tardy to roll call on fifteen occasions. While Officer Vogel
disputed these allegations, Captain Soroko informed him that he
had documentation to support his assertions and that he would
inform Officer Vogel later as to whether his conduct would result
in discipline. Ultimately, Captain Soroko did not discipline Officer
Vogel for his shortcomings.
As a result of the interview, the Union filed a charge of unfair
labor practices with the PLRB. The Union alleged that by refus-
ing to allow Officer Vogel to have Officer Panko represent him
Spring 2006
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during the interview, the Commonwealth violated Section
1201(a)(1) of PERA, contending that the Commonwealth inter-
fered with Officer Vogel's right as an employee to be free from in-
terference, restraint and coercion in exercising his individual
rights under PERA and Section 1201(a)(5), asserting that the
Commonwealth violated the rights of the Union for purposes of
collective bargaining.9 The PLRB issued a complaint and held a
hearing on May 17, 2002, before a hearing examiner.
The hearing examiner issued a Proposed Decision and Order on
June 26, 2002, dismissing the charge of unfair labor practice. Ac-
cording to the hearing examiner, the Union failed to establish both
that Officer Panko was readily available and that Officer Vogel
was entitled to Officer Panko's representation; thus, the examiner
dismissed the Union's charge regarding Officer Vogel's individual
employee rights under Section 1201(a)(1). The hearing examiner
also dismissed the Union's claim under Section 1201(a)(5) that its
collective bargaining rights were violated. The Union filed excep-
tions to the hearing examiner's Proposed Decision and Order.
On January 28, 2003, the PLRB issued a Final Order, rejecting
the findings of the hearing examiner and concluding that the
Commonwealth had committed an unfair labor practice by failing
to provide Officer Vogel with his choice of available union repre-
sentative. Focusing on Captain Soroko's accusation of past mis-
conduct which could lead to discipline and his lack of a decision as
to whether discipline would be meted out, the PLRB first found
that Officer Vogel was subjected to an investigatory interview,
which implicated Officer Vogel's Weingarten rights. The PLRB
then questioned whether, in exercising his Weingarten rights, an
employee has the right to choose from available representatives in
the workplace. After reviewing its own decisions and NLRB
precedent, the PLRB held that an employee is entitled to an avail-
able representative of his or her choice, absent extenuating cir-
cumstances. Based upon Officer Lennert's offer to permit Officer
Panko to attend the interview, the PLRB concluded that Officer
9. 43 P.S. §§ 1101.1201(a)(1) and (5). Section 1201 of PERA provides in relevant part:
(a)Public employers, their agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering, restraining or coercing employes in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Article IV of this act.
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employe rep-
resentative which is the exclusive representative of employes in an ap-
propriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances
with the exclusive representative.
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Panko was present and available to participate in the session with
Captain Soroko and Officer Vogel. Thus, the PLRB determined
that the Commonwealth violated Section 1201(a)(1) by rejecting
Officer Vogel's request for Officer Panko's representation. Impor-
tantly, the PLRB rejected the Union's assertion that the Com-
monwealth violated its collective bargaining rights under Section
1201(a)(5) of PERA, finding that the Weingarten right was a right
of the employee. The Commonwealth appealed the PLRB's deci-
sion to the Commonwealth Court.
C. Significant Legal Background
Office of Administration raises the contentious issue of an em-
ployee's right to representation during an investigatory interview
- an issue which has vexed federal and state tribunals alike. To
understand the legal principles involved, a review of the statutory
and decisional law is necessary. The NLRA was forged of the
Great Depression, which saw the continued rise of the labor
movement, violent strikes, the lack of a strong labor policy, and
the advent of the New Deal. Enacted in 1935, the purpose of the
NLRA, or the Wagner Act,1" was to end the causes of certain sig-
nificant impediments to the free flow of commerce by the removal
of sources of industrial strife and unrest. This was to be accom-
plished by the encouragement of the practice of collective bargain-
ing and by protecting employees' full freedom of association, the
right of self-organization and collective bargaining,11 and by pro-
hibiting certain employer unfair labor practices. 2 The heart of the
NLRA is Section 7 which catalogues the rights of all covered em-
ployees: to self-organize, to form, join or assist labor organizations,
to collectively bargaining over terms and conditions of employ-
ment and to partake in "other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Sec-
tion 7's rights are not limited to collective bargaining; indeed, it is
hornbook law that the protections of "other concerted activities for
10. Senator Robert Wagner of New York introduced the bill that would become the
NLRA in 1934. The bill, faced with vigorous opposition, even at times from President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's administration, owed its success to Senator Wagner's efforts.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 7 states in relevant part: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organize, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection..." 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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mutual aid and protection" sweeps in - but extends beyond -
efforts to form a union and to engage in collective bargaining. It
applies accordingly to both the unionized and non-union work-
place and, in the latter, to activity that has no obvious relation-
ship to unionization and collective bargaining."" Thus, the focus
of the Act has been on the rights of employees, both individually
and collectively.
Following the example of the NLRA, the Pennsylvania General
Assembly sought to give similar rights as those protected by the
NLRA to certain Commonwealth public employees. Akin to the
events which sparked the enactment of the NLRA, PERA was
born of the tumultuous 1960's; a time marked by the distrust of
government, labor strife, and the resulting interruption of public
services. Enacted in 1970, PERA's purpose was to "promote or-
derly and constructive relationships between all public employers
and their employes subject, however, to the paramount right of
the citizens ... to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health,
safety and welfare." 5 Recognizing that unresolved workplace dis-
putes in the public sector were injurious to the public weal, the
General Assembly responded by offering that, in order to facilitate
harmonious relationships between public employer and public
employee, public employees would be granted the right to choose
their bargaining representatives, negotiate with public employers,
and establish procedures to protect the rights of the public em-
ployee, the public employer, and the public at large.'6 Virtually
identical to Section 7 of the NLRA, PERA's core is found in Section
401 which makes it "lawful for public employes" to organize, join
or assist in employee organizations or to "engage in lawful con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid and protection.. . 7
In 1975, in its landmark decision in Weingarten, the United
States Supreme Court recognized under the NLRA what is now
commonly referred to as an employee's Weingarten rights. Specifi-
cally, in a 6-3 decision the Supreme Court affirmed the NLRB's
14. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 397 (Patrick Hardin and John E. Higgins, Jr. eds.,
4th ed. 2005).
15. 43 P.S. § 1101.101.
16. Id.
17. 43 P.S. §1101.401. Section 401 states in relevant part: "It shall be lawful for public
employees to organize, form, join or assist in employe organizations or to engage in lawful
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protec-
tion or to bargain collectively through representatives of their own free choice .. ." 43 P.S.
§ 1101.401.
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holding that a union employee, pursuant to Section 7 of the
NLRA, is entitled to have a union representative be present at an
investigatory interview where the employee reasonably believes
that the session may result in discipline."8 Furthermore, the em-
ployer's refusal of an employee's request for union representation
during such an investigatory interview constitutes an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 9 as it interferes with
the individual employee's core rights as provided for in Section 7
of the Act.2"
In Weingarten, an employer, while conducting an investigation
regarding the suspected theft of money at its retail establishment,
repeatedly interrogated an employee, who was represented by a
union, about the alleged short-changing of a cash register during
the purchase of food.21 After her numerous requests for a union
representative to be present during the interrogation were denied,
the employee ultimately confessed to an unrelated violation of the
employer's policy against eating "free lunches" while at work.22
In finding that the employer's denial of the employee's request
for a union representative violated the NLRA and that an em-
ployee was entitled to a union representative during an investiga-
tive interview, Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority,
was clear as to the primary source of this right:
[Tihe action of an employee in seeking to have the assis-
tance of his union representative at a confrontation with
his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of §7
that "[employees] shall have the right ... to engage in...
concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid or
protection."23
The High Court explained that this right to representation is
found within the employee's Section 7 right "even though the em-
ployee alone may have an immediate stake in the outcome; he
seeks 'aid or protection' against a perceived threat to his employ-
ment security."2 4 The Court offered various reasons in support of
its construing the statute in this fashion.
18. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 260.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(l).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
21. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 254.
22. Id. at 254-55.




First, the Court noted the dual nature of the NLRA's protec-
tions, individual as well as group, as the presence of a union rep-
resentative during interrogation protected "not only the particular
employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire bargaining
unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that the employer
does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment
unjustly."5 Furthermore, the Court pointed to the inequality of
the relative power of employees and employers and offered that
"requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory interview"
was inconsistent with the Act's intention of ending this inequal-
ity.2
6
Finally, the Court emphasized the positive aspects that union
representation would bring to the investigatory process - for both
employee and employer. Specifically, the Court maintained that a
lone employee "confronted by an employer investigating whether
certain conduct deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticu-
late to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ig-
norant to raise extenuating circumstances."" According to the
Court, a well-versed union representative "could assist the em-
ployer by eliciting favorable facts, and save the employer produc-
tion time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the
interview."28 Recognizing the practical nature of the disciplinary
process, and the importance of timing, the Court countered the
argument that representation could be deferred until the filing of
a formal grievance challenging the employer's discipline and de-
termination of guilt by offering that at that point "it becomes in-
creasingly difficult for the employee to vindicate himself, and the
value of representation is correspondingly diminished. The em-
ployer may then be more concerned with justifying his actions
than re-examining them."9 Thus, for these reasons, the Court
concluded that a union representative would positively impact the
investigatory process and embraced the concept of union represen-
tation during an investigatory interview where the employee rea-
sonably believed that the meeting may result in discipline.
The PLRB embraced the concept of Weingarten rights for pur-
poses of PERA a mere five years after the United States Supreme
25. Id. at 260-61.
26. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 262.
27. Id. at 262-63.
28. Id. at 263.
29. Id. at 263-64.
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Court's seminal decision. In PLRB v. Township of Shaler, ° the
PLRB adopted the rule announced in Weingarten, finding that the
rights granted to public employees pursuant to Section 401 of
PERA included the right to union representation during an inves-
tigatory interview. The PLRB's adoption of Weingarten has been
upheld on appeal by the lower Pennsylvania appellate courts ever
since.31
While the Weingarten rule has now become an entrenched part
of the labor law landscape in both this state and federally for over
a quarter century, the breadth and implications of this right con-
tinue to be the subject of re-evaluation and debate. Specifically,
the NLRB was left to determine various aspects of the right, in-
cluding the issue of whether employees in a non-union setting
were also entitled to have a co-worker present during an investi-
gatory session; 32 the remedies for a violation of an employee's
Weingarten right;3 and whether an employee had his or her choice
of representative when faced with an investigatory interview.
The NLRB recently spoke to the question of employee choice of
representative for purposes of federal law in Anheuser-Busch,
Inc.' In that case an employee was confronted with an investiga-
tory interview that could result in discipline. When the employee
asked for representation, the employer provided such representa-
tion, but not the employee's choice of representative. Finding the
requested representative available to engage in the interview, the
administrative law judge found that the employer had violated the
employee's rights under Weingarten. The NLRB affirmed the ad-
ministrative law judge's ruling, findings, and conclusions, and,
after considering certain prior NLRB precedent,35 concluded that
"in a Weingarten setting, an employee has the right to specify the
representative he or she wants, and the employer is obligated to
30. 11 PPER 11347 (Nisi Decision and Order, 1980); see also PLRB v. Conneaut
School District, 10 PPER 10082 (Nisi Decision and Order, 1979), affd 12 PPER 12155
(Final Order, 1981).
31. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. PLRB, 826 A.2d 932 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003);
AFSCME v. PLRB, 514 A.2d 255 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986)
32. Christine Neylon O'Brien, The NLRB Waffling on Weingarten Rights, 37 LOY. U.
Ciu. L.J. 111 (Fall 2005); Sarah C. Flannery, Extending Weingarten to the Nonunion Set-
ting:A History of Oscillation, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 163 (2001).
33. Michael D. Moberly and Andrea G. Lisenbee, Honing Our Kraft?: Reconciling
Variations in the Remedial Treatment of Weingarten Violations, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 523 (Spring 2004).
34. 337 NLRB 3 (2001).
35. See Consolidation Coal Co., 307 NLRB 976 (1992); GHR Energy Corp., 294 NLRB
840 (1989); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 253 NLRB 1143 (1981).
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supply that representative absent some extenuating circum-
stances.""
This approach by the NLRB was formally adopted for purposes
of PERA by the PLRB in Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers
Association v. Commonwealth.37 In reaching its conclusion that
employee choice was mandated under Weingarten, the PLRB re-
lied primarily upon the NLRB's prior decision in Anheuser-Busch,
Inc. as well as public sector precedent. The PLRB also noted that
on two prior occasions, Pennsylvania hearing examiners had em-
braced such a view.38
D. The Commonwealth Court's Decision in Office of Administra-
tion v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board
When faced with the same issue, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the PLRB's reliance upon NLRB precedent
and negated a public employee's right to choose a representative of
his choice when invoking his Weingarten right. In reaching its
decision, the majority of the three-judge panel first agreed with
the PLRB that the counseling session constituted an "investiga-
tory interview" implicating Officer Vogel's Weingarten rights. Not
only did Officer Vogel focus on the potential disciplinary action to
be taken as a result of the interview, but Captain Soroko ex-
plained that he was deferring a decision regarding discipline until
some later time.39
With respect to the issue of a public employee's choice of union
representative, the Commonwealth Court, while acknowledging
that the PLRB may look to federal precedent in interpreting pro-
visions of PERA that are similar to the NLRA, cautioned that the
PLRB nevertheless must determine if reliance on such precedent
is appropriate.4 ° The Commonwealth Court offered a number of
reasons why PERA was legally distinguishable and led to a differ-
ing result with respect to this question in the public sector.
First, the court offered generalized statements regarding the
difference between the NLRA and PERA. "PERA is a much differ-
ent act than the NLRA and contains many different provisions
36. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 337 NLRB at 8.
37. 34 PPER 1 1 (Final Order 2002).
38. District 1199P, SEIU v. Department of Public Welfare, 32 PPER 32177 (Proposed
Decision and Order, 2001); AFSCME v. Department of Corrections, 32 PPER 32131 (Pro-
posed Decision and Order, 2001).
39. Office of Administration, 848 A.2d at 1067.
40. Id.
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that make an enormous difference in how the acts should be in-
terpreted."4 ' Likewise, the court continued "NLRB's interpreta-
tions may not apply because those interpretations involve only
private employers and private unions and a relationship that only
affects them, not public employers and public unions, whose rela-
tionship determines how the public is served and what faith the
public has in its government."'
The court went on to give its most significant reason for reject-
ing employee choice of representative. "Nothing in PERA gives
the Board the power to vest in any particular employee any par-
ticular collective bargaining rights because PERA is a collective
bargaining statute vesting all rights in a union, and only it and no
individual employee has any individual collective bargaining right
vis-h-vis the employer." 43 The court continued that PERA's rele-
vant sections
have nothing to do with the rights of individual employ-
ees, but only the rights of the union. The Weingarten rule
rests solely on the provisions of PERA that involve collec-
tive bargaining rights giving the union the right to be
present to protect its interest; however, nothing in Wein-
garten confers any individual rights.'
Additionally, an employee's right to the representative of his or
her choice would also violate "an inherent management right to
discipline and the right of the union to determine how the collec-
tive bargaining agreement is to be administered."4' The court
noted that unlike the NLRA, which does not require a grievance
and arbitration procedure, PERA mandates arbitration in cases of
disputes arising from the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, because discipline is a management preroga-
tive, all that is required for Weingarten is that a union representa-
tive be present to protect the union's rights for future grievance-
arbitration proceedings.46
Consistent with its characterization of PERA, the court went on
to opine that the employer is under no obligation to honor a re-
quest for a particular union representative unless the collective
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1067-68.
43. Id. at 1068.
44. Office of Administration, 848 A.2d at 1068.




bargaining agreement contains such a requirement.47 That being
the case, the court turned to the grievance and arbitration provi-
sion in the collective bargaining agreement. The court focused on
the first step of the process concerning the presentation of a writ-
ten grievance for consideration by the employer. As the agree-
ment did not provide the employee with the option of choosing his
or her representative, according to the majority, this choice was
not available to the employee. 48 Finally, the court concluded that
permitting the employee to choose his representative would un-
dermine the employer union relationship and could lead to "addi-
tional problems" if the selected representative did not have the
time or inclination to assist.49 Thus, the court reversed the PLRB's
decision.
Senior Judge Joseph McClosky filed a dissent, focusing on a dif-
ferent aspect of the appeal. He opined that even if one conceded
that the right of representation belongs to a union, under the facts
of the case, the majority permitted the employer to select Officer
Vogel's representative. This was because even after the Union,
through Officer Lennert, supported Officer Vogel's selection of Of-
ficer Panko as his choice for representative by offering to relieve
Officer Panko from duty to represent Officer Vogel, the employer
rejected the proposition and insisted upon representation by Offi-
cer Lennert.5' Somewhat poetically, the dissent concluded, "The
right to representation, where the adversarial party has the power
to choose who will represent the other party, is not a right to rep-
resentation at all."51
E. Analysis
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's decision is multifac-
eted. On one hand, the opinion is remarkable for its sweeping de-
scription of the character of PERA, which if taken on its face calls
into question the very existence of the rights of individual employ-
ees under that statute and the Weingarten right itself. Unfortu-
nately, the opinion also leaves the reader wanting for more in
terms of its justification for the court's parting from federal labor
policy. In its resolution of the narrow issue of an employee's
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Office of Administration, 848 A.2d at 1070.
50. Id. at 1070-71.
51. Id. at 1071.
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choice of union representative, however, its analysis is not without
foundation, and indeed challenges current thought regarding limi-
tations upon public sector employee Weingarten rights.
First, the Commonwealth Court's breathtakingly broad com-
mentary regarding the nature of PERA being a "collective bargain-
ing statute" which vests "all rights" exclusively in the union,
would seemingly constitute a drastic change in how that legisla-
tive enactment has been interpreted by the PLRB and Pennsyl-
vania courts. By its terms, PERA's nucleus recognizes the right of
"public employes" to engage in various activities, including con-
certed activities for mutual aid and protection.52 Consistent with
this statutory language, Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law
and prior Commonwealth Court decisions suggest that PERA con-
tinues to recognize both collective bargaining rights as well as in-
dividual employee rights and that the Commonwealth Court's
statements to the contrary were simply too blunt an instrument to
be used in describing the entire spectrum of rights under PERA.53
Additionally, and as noted above, Section 7 of the NLRA and Sec-
tion 401 of PERA are virtually. identical. This would, at least on
the surface, intimate similar constructions to be accorded to these
analogous statutes. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has at
least insinuated that while certainly not bound by the federal la-
bor experience, NLRB decisions interpreting similar provisions
are of persuasive value unless distinguishable.54
Conversely, the Commonwealth Court's decision is parsimoni-
ous with respect to its discussion of the roots of the Weingarten
rule in determining the rights of public employees under PERA.
More specifically, the Weingarten Court, as offered above,
grounded its decision on the employee's right to engage in con-
certed activities for mutual aid and protection and not in the bar-
gaining rights of the union. Thus, the Commonwealth Court's
equating of Weingarten rights with collective bargaining rights
begs for further elucidation by the court of its collective bargaining
approach in light of the foundations of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Weingarten. Indeed, while certain scholarship
has challenged the Weingarten decision itself as a flawed interpre-
52. 43 P.S. § 1101.401.
53. Hollinger v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 365 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1976) (explaining that
PERA was designed to protect the rights of all public employees, not just those who are
unionized); PLRB v. Zelem, 329 A.2d 477 (Pa. 1974); PLRB v. Rizzo, 344 A.2d 744 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1975).
54. See Appeal of Cumberland Valley School District, 394 A.2d 946 (Pa. 1978).
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tation of the NLRA due to its equating the statutory right of "mu-
tual aid and protection" with a single employee's right of represen-
tation - a solely individualized interest rather on behalf of the
entire group of employees5 - the Commonwealth Court does not
appear to go as far as the elimination of Weingarten rights. This,
however, is the logical conclusion that might follow from a collec-
tive bargaining construct of the Weingarten right. Indeed, the
Commonwealth Court's approach raises a number of unanswered
questions. For example, if the Weingarten right is a collective
bargaining right, does an employer now have to negotiate over the
investigative interview process itself as a mandatory subject of
bargaining? Furthermore, if a union has been elected by the ap-
propriate unit of employees, but no collective bargaining agree-
ment has been reached with the employer, does the Weingarten
right exist at all for those employees who are with a union but
without a contract and faced with an investigatory interview? Fi-
nally, is the employer really choosing the employee's representa-
tive, as suggested by the dissent, when it can dictate which union
official will represent the employee and how does this square with
the Weingarten decision?
Related thereto, while the Commonwealth Court concentrated
on the grievance and arbitration procedure and noted that such
dispute resolution process is distinct under state law as it is re-
quired to be part of collective bargaining agreements under PERA,
it did not engage in a discussion of the underlying practical policy
reasons that were the engine that drove the Weingarten decision.
Indeed, the Weingarten Court went to great lengths to explain the
benefit to both employee and employer by permitting union repre-
sentation during an investigatory interview. Primary among
these benefits was the reduction in disputes subjected to the for-
mal grievance arbitration procedure, a savings in time, money,
and effort to both employee and employer. This would appear to
transcend any distinction between the private workplace and the
public workplace. Explication of how these practical concerns may
differ in the public setting would have been beneficial in resolving
these questions.
While the Commonwealth Court speaks in broad terms with re-
spect to all rights under PERA being grounded in collective bar-
55. See King, Johnson, and Winchester, Who Let the Weingarten Rights Out? The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board Compounds Earlier Error by the Supreme Court, 2002 L. REV.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 149, 156 (Spring 2002).
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gaining and vested in the union, if these statements are contextu-
alized to the issue of employee choice of representative, the Com-
monwealth Court's characterization of PERA becomes more mean-
ingful. Specifically, the court's analysis raises interesting ques-
tions regarding the meaning and breadth of exclusive representa-
tion by a union of the employees that it represents. The concept of
exclusive bargaining representation is foundational to both federal
and state labor law. It is the notion that the union, as exclusive
bargaining representative, may not be bypassed by an employer
with respect to bargaining or the adjustment of employee griev-
ances and the imposition of discipline.56 Yet, if individual employ-
ees could choose their representative, would not this undermine
the union's role as exclusive bargaining representative of the unit
of employees? The Commonwealth Court's approach becomes
even more powerful when one considers that the United States
Supreme Court in Weingarten emphasized the twin purposes of
protecting individual employees and the bargaining unit, thus
raising the prospect of a right not limited to possession by the in-
dividual employee, but also the suggestion of it being a collective
right. If the rights of the entire bargaining unit were implicated,
an argument could be made that consistent administration,
through the use of a union-selected representative, would be in
accord with a collective bargaining paradigm with respect to
Weingarten rights. While this approach to the right was not fully
teased out by the Commonwealth Court, it is clearly implied from
the opinion.
Furthermore, there are prior NLRB decisions which to some ex-
tent support the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that an em-
ployee is not entitled to his or her choice of representative. Spe-
cifically, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co., the NLRB addressed a
situation in which an employee refused the assistance of a union
representative present at the place of employment and demanded
the presence of one who was not readily available and who did not
represent employees at that location. In holding that the worker's
Weingarten rights were not violated, the NLRB employed lan-
guage suggesting that the right to chose representation rests with
the union. "To the contrary, the focus of [Weingarten] is on the
56. 43 P.S. § 1101.606 (establishing that "representatives selected by public employees
in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining purposes shall be the exclusive representa-
tive of all employes in such unit to bargain on wages, hours, terms and conditions of em-
ployment...").
57. 253 NLRB 1143 (1981).
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employee's right to the presence of a union representative desig-
nated by the union to represent all employees."58 The NLRB con-
tinued, "a duly designated union representative was ready, will-
ing, able, and present. We would inquire no further."59 While Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. may be fact specific, and was noted in An-
heuser-Busch, Inc. as being superseded by subsequent NLRB deci-
sions, the Commonwealth Court's approach in this case is cer-
tainly grounded in prior NLRB case law, and thus, is not without
support.
In conclusion, on one hand Office of Administration has called
into question the foundational underpinnings of PERA by suggest-
ing that PERA only protects collective bargaining and that all
rights under the statute are vested with the union rather than
with the individual pubic employee. Even viewed more narrowly,
it suggests a re-examination of the meaning of exclusive represen-
tation and the scope of that doctrine in the Weingarten context. It
has, however, given a clear answer to the question of whether a
public employee in Pennsylvania has a choice of union representa-
tive when exercising his or her Weingarten rights. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court will have the opportunity to not only pass on
the more narrow issue of representative choice, but to resolve any
doubts that the decision in Office of Administration has raised as
to the greater issue of the rights of individual employees under
PERA.
III. THE RIGHTS OF PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES:
GEHRING V. PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
A. Introduction
In Gehring v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, a unani-
mous Commonwealth Court, en banc, held that a probationary
police officer is protected from discharge for engaging in union
activities. In doing so, the court vacated the order of the PLRB
and its determination that the protections of the state labor laws
do not protect a police officer until after that officer has success-
fully completed his or her probationary period. Previously, in Up-
per Makefield Township v. PLRB, ° the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania concluded that police officers who have not passed their
58. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 253 NLRB at 1143.
59. Id. at 1144.
60. 753 A.2d 803 (Pa. 2000).
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probationary period do not enjoy the protections of Act 111 with
respect to the right to bargain and to have their grievances heard.
In distinguishing Upper Makefield, the Commonwealth Court rea-
soned that both the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act (PLRA)61
and Act 111 permit employees to engage in collective bargaining.
While the Supreme Court in Upper Makefield held that Act 111,
which governs the rights of police officers and firefighters, does
not grant rights to probationary employees, according to the
Commonwealth Court, there was an open question as to whether a
probationary employee could bring a claim alleging an unfair labor
practice under the PLRA if he or she were terminated for engag-
ing in union activities. Ultimately, the Commonwealth Court de-
termined that police officers and firefighters, such as Officer Ge-
hring, could bring an action for a violation of their rights as ex-
pressed in the PLRA.
B. Facts and Procedural History.
On February 3, 2003, Rodger Gehring was sworn in as a full-
time probationary police officer for the Borough of Hamburg,
Pennsylvania (Borough). Prior to becoming a full-time officer, Of-
ficer Gehring worked for the Borough as a part-time officer. On
the date that he assumed his full-time status, Officer Gehring was
informed that he would be considered less senior than another
officer who was also newly-hired. The other officer, however, had
never worked for the Borough. Officer Gehring challenged his
seniority status and the Hamburg Police Officer's Association (As-
sociation) filed a grievance on Officer Gehring's behalf. Specifi-
cally, the Association sought greater seniority for Officer Gehring
based upon his prior years of service with the Borough.
After the Association filed the grievance, Officer Gehring had a
number of conversations with the Borough Chief of Police who
warned him that the filing of the grievance would adversely im-
pact his career with the Borough. Furthermore, the Chief of Po-
lice informed the Borough Mayor that he did not want "an officer
working for him that is going to file a grievance against him." Re-
lated thereto, the Borough Council President opined that the Bor-
ough "was not looking for this in a supervisor or corporal." Officer
Gehring, however, contended that he was a model employee and in
fact, on March 26, 2003, he received a special commendation as a
61. Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 211.1-211.13.
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result of his work concerning a drug arrest. Somewhat ironically,
the same day he received his commendation, Officer Gehring was
informed that he was being suspended pending an investigation
by the Chief of Police. Shortly thereafter, Officer Gehring's em-
ployment with the Borough was terminated.
Believing his termination to be retaliatory for the filing of his
grievance and motivated by anti-union animus as expressed by
Borough officials, Officer Gehring filed a charge of unfair labor
practices against the Borough. The Secretary of the PLRB deter-
mined that the protections of the relevant labor laws do not apply
until a police officer has successfully completed his probationary
period. Thus, on June 5, 2003, the Secretary informed Officer Ge-
hring that no complaint would be issued and that his charge of
unfair labor practice would be dismissed. Officer Gehring filed
exceptions to the Secretary's determination, and thereafter the
PLRB issued a Final Order affirming the Secretary and holding
that the PLRB lacked jurisdiction to entertain such a claim of dis-
crimination under the PLRA and Act 111.
C. Significant Legal Background
Two foundational legal principles are implicated in Gehring; one
involving the construction and interplay between Act 111 and the
PLRA and the other concerning the status of probationary em-
ployees under the Commonwealth's labor laws. With respect to
the construction of the applicable labor statutes, in Philadelphia
Fire Officers Assoc. v. PLRB,62 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was faced with the issue of how to determine the collective bar-
gaining representative of a unit of firefighters where Act 111
made no express provision for the conduct of elections by the
PLRB. The PLRA, which was enacted two years after the NLRA,
and which gave individual employee and collective bargaining
rights to Pennsylvania employees in the private sector, including
certain employees who were not covered by the NLRA, provided
express and detailed procedures for the collective bargaining proc-
ess and the prevention of unfair labor practices. On the other
hand, Act 111, which in 1968 recognized the bargaining rights of
police officers and firefighters, contained no procedural guidance
for the selection of a bargaining representative or resolution of
62. 369 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1977).
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unfair labor practices.63 To resolve this quandary, the Pennsyl-
vania High Court turned to the Statutory Construction Act 4 which
offered that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed
together as one statute, if possible. The Court concluded that the
PLRA and Act 111 were in pari materia and were to be construed
together as a single statute." Thus, the Court reasonably deter-
mined that the gaps found in Act 111 were to be filled by provi-
sions found in the PLRA.
While the approach to the construction of the PLRA and Act 111
has now been settled for almost thirty years, articulation of the
rights of probationary employees for purposes of labor relations is
of more recent vintage. In 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided Upper Makefield where a probationary police officer was
held to lack the protection of Act 111 until after his completion of
probation. 6 A unanimous High Court found that those employees
who satisfied their probationary period "assume a status protected
by the right to bargain collectively and to have their grievances
heard" and those who are probationary employees are engaged in
a "strictly 'at will' relationship."" While set in the context of a
probationary police officer attempting to grieve his dismissal, the
Court spoke in broad terms, offering that the probationary status
"distinguishes those police and firemen who come within the am-
bit of Act 111 protections and those who do not."6
Only one year later, in Township of Sugarloaf v. Bowling,69 the
Supreme Court again faced an issue involving a grievance filed by
a probationary employee. Like Upper Makefield, the substance of
the grievance concerned the officer's termination. While arguably
injecting uncertainty into an understanding of the ability of proba-
tionary employees to file a grievance, the Court made clear that
the question of whether a probationary employee may initiate the
grievance arbitration process was not at issue, but rather only
what tribunal is initially to make that decision, a trial court or an
63. Philadelphia Fire Officers Assoc., 369 A.2d 261.
64. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932. Section 1932 states that, "(a) Statutes or parts of stat-
utes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class
of persons or things. (b) Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as
one statute." 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1932.
65. Philadelphia Firefighters Association, 369 A.2d at 261.
66. Upper Makefield Township, 753 A.2d at 807.
67. Id. at 806.
68. Id.
69. 759 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2000).
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arbitrator." The Court held that a probationary police officer had
a statutory right under Act 111 to have a grievance submitted to
an arbitrator for an initial determination regarding the arbitrabil-
ity of the grievance. Finally, in 2002, the Commonwealth Court's
decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. PLRB71 affirmed by the
Supreme Court by per curiam order, found that probationary po-
lice officers did not have an enforceable right to collectively bar-
gain as the protections of Act 111 only covered those who have
successfully completed their probationary period.72
D. The Commonwealth Court Decision in Gehring v. Pennsyl-
vania Labor Relations Board
The Commonwealth Court determined that probationary police
officers were protected from discharge based upon union activities
and thus vacated the order of the PLRB. Recognizing the diffi-
culty posed by the inadequacies of Act 111, the court initially en-
gaged in an analysis of both Act 111 and the PLRA, noting that
the parties agreed that the statutes were to be construed in pari
materia 3 Taking into account the focus of Act 111 as well as the
Supreme Court's prior case law which afforded probationary em-
ployees "no rights,"74 the court turned to the PLRA. The Com-
monwealth Court first addressed the language of the PLRA which
recognized the right to collectively bargain by "employees" who, by
statute, included "any employe, . . . and shall include any individ-
ual whose work has ceased as a consequence of or in connection
with ... any unfair labor practice."" After turning to the PLRA's
protections against employer unfair labor practices, including in-
terfering with the rights of employees to engage in union activi-
70. Sugarloaf, 759 A.2d at 916 n.5.
71. 764 A.2d 92 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000), affd per curiam 810 A.2d 1240 (Pa. 2002).
72. Justice Thomas Saylor dissented, opining that the result was contrary to the
Court's decision in Sugarloaf, and noting inconsistency with prior precedent under PERA
which recognized the rights of probationary employees, citing Board of Education of the
School District of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 346 A.2d 35 (Pa.
1975). Justice Saylor advocated that rather than eliminating all probationary officers from
the protections of Act 111, only an exception with respect to a grievance over the unsuccess-
ful completion of probation was necessary. Indeed, Justice Saylor's approach may have
been the inspiration behind the Commonwealth Court's approach in Gehring.
73. Gehring, 850 A.2d at 805.
74. Id. at 807.
75. 43 P.S. § 211.5.
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ties, 6 and prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law in which
police officers could file unfair labor practice charges under the
PLRA,7 the Commonwealth Court squarely faced Upper Make-
field.
The Commonwealth Court, recognizing the Upper Makefield
Court's seemingly broad holding that probationary police officers
were not afforded the protections of Act 111, distinguished Upper
Makefield on the basis that in that decision, the probationary po-
lice officer was attempting to file for mandatory arbitration, a sub-
stantive right expressly provided for in Act 111. Here, according
to the Commonwealth Court, a substantive right under the PLRA
was at issue, the right to engage in union activities, and thus, the
probationary status of the police officer did not act as a bar to the
PLRB's entertaining the officer's unfair labor practice charge
brought pursuant to the PLRA.5 The court clarified that Act 111
did not address the issue of recourse for termination for engaging
in union activities and that the provisions of the PLRA do speak to
this issue, and further, that the rights under the PLRA are appli-
cable to "employees," which do not exclude probationary employ-
ees; it then went on to hold that the PLRB did not lack jurisdiction
to consider Officer Gehring's charges against the Borough for his
termination for engaging in union activities.79
E. Analysis
In Gehring, the Commonwealth Court crafted a unanimous
opinion creatively and logically navigating between the seemingly
sweeping mandate of Upper Makefield with respect to the status
of probationary employees and the clear public policy undergird-
ing the applicable labor laws regarding the protection of workers
in their right to engage in union activities and to be free from em-
ployer coercion. The court embraced a practical middle ground by
which probationary employees could not challenge their failure to
be made permanent employees, but could vindicate their substan-
tive collective bargaining rights, including the right to be free from
discrimination by their employer based upon union activities.
76. 43 P.S. § 211.6(1)(a) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain, coerce employes in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in this
act." 43 P.S. § 211.6(1)(a).
77. Borough of Nazareth v. PLRB, 626 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1993).
78. Gehring, 850 A.2d at 808-09.
79. Id. at 810.
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The difficulty with the Commonwealth Court's approach lies not
in its intentions, as it is clear that the court was troubled by the
prospect of probationary employees being left without protection
and employers discharging probationary employees due to anti-
union animus. Rather, it is the Commonwealth Court's attempt to
address the arguably all encompassing language used by the Su-
preme Court in Upper Makefield regarding a probationary em-
ployee's status as an at-will employee. Furthermore, the Com-
monwealth Court's approach raises serious questions regarding an
in pari materia construction of the PLRA and Act 111. As a result
of the Commonwealth Court's decision, it would appear that there
are two definitions of employee - one for the PLRA and one for
Act 111. Whether there are valid reasons underlying such a dis-
tinction, in light of the interpretive mandate of reading the stat-
utes together, was not fully explained by the Commonwealth
Court.
Of course, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not required to
repeat the gerrymandering engaged in by the Commonwealth
Court. In deciding this matter, and not being bound by a higher
appellate tribunal, the Pennsylvania High Court could interpret
Act 111 and the PLRA to create a bright-line rule that probation-
ary employees enjoy none of the protections of any of the Com-
monwealth's labor laws, consistent with at least the suggestion of
such breadth in Upper Makefield. This approach raises difficult
policy questions including the reason why discriminatory and ad-
verse actions against a newly-hired employee due to anti-union
animus should be tolerated, or was intended to be tolerated by the
Legislature. Furthermore, such an approach might encourage
employers to extend probationary periods, perhaps indefimitely, to
be free of the strictures of the state's labor laws. A related issue
would be whether a union could collectively bargain on behalf of
probationary employees since they would seemingly not be part of
the bargaining unit. Thus, such an approach could lead to proba-
tionary employees not enjoying any of the benefits or protections a
union might achieve at the bargaining table with respect to wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment such as health
care, sick leave, and vacation, simply because of their rookie
status. Related thereto, are probationary employees eligible to
vote in a union election if they are not employees for purposes of
Act 111? While such a hands-off approach might make sense with
respect to the employer's ultimate decision to hire or to terminate
the probationary employee for unsatisfactory performance, the
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validity of this option wanes with respect to other aspects of the
employment relationship.
A second equally clear option would be to reevaluate the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's position with respect to probationary
employees. By limiting Upper Makefield and providing probation-
ary employees the full panoply of protections that the General As-
sembly bestowed upon permanent employees, it would eliminate
some the problems mentioned above as well as the dual definition
of who is an employee under Act 111 and the PLRA, making these
statutes truly pari materia. Furthermore, such an approach
would bring the Commonwealth in line with the federal treatment
of probationary employees under the NLRA." It would also elimi-
nate the misperception that at-will employees are not protected by
labor and employment laws. Indeed, while the at-will doctrine,
and its teaching that employees may be terminated at any time,
for any reason or for no reason, remains strong in Pennsylvania,8
such employees still enjoy the protections provided in labor and
employment statutes - provisions which constitute, in essence, a
recognized statutory exception to the at-will doctrine."
Conversely, such a bright line approach would also blind the law
to the unique status of probationary employees. These individuals
are not permanent employees. They are newly hired employees
who are on trial. To grant them the same rights as permanent
employees would serve to not only blur or possibly eliminate their
unique status, but to handcuff employers and diminish their un-
fettered discretion with respect to this initial testing period in the
employment relationship.
Finally, the Supreme Court could adopt the approach of the
Commonwealth Court, in essence creating a dual system of rights
for probationary employees requiring a case-by-case determination
of the relevant statutory provisions and analysis of the probation-
ary employee's rights. Whether the middle course charted by the
Commonwealth Court will be upheld or whether a new point on
the compass will be followed is now in the hands of the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court.
80. See, e.g., Gulf States United Telephone Co., 253 NLRB 603 (1980).
81. See, e.g., Rothrock v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 883 A.2d 511 (Pa. 2005).
82. See Christensen and Kight, Section 7 and the Non-Union Employer, 60 J. Mo. B.





The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has recently ren-
dered two significant decisions. Each opinion addresses not only
the narrow legal question before the court, but also speaks to lar-
ger issues concerning individual employee rights under Pennsyl-
vania's labor laws. Viewed perhaps even more broadly, these de-
cisions are part of the growing body of law that is attempting to
define the boundaries between employer, employee, and union.
Currently, due to the legal and political environment that exists
today regarding labor relations, there is a re-examination of the
competing interests of these groups and a corresponding realign-
ment in terms of rights and responsibilities suggesting greater
rights for the individual employee under current labor laws.8" The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will have the opportunity to con-
tribute to this ever-important and evolving area of the law.
83. See William R. Corbett, Waiting For the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:
Everything Old is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259 (2002) (offering commen-
tary on the vulnerability of workers, the suggested irrelevancy of unions, and the promise
of application of labor laws to nonunion employees); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Leg-
acy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the
New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Clu. L. REv. 575 (Spring 1992).
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